Staff Report — Shiseido announced on November 17 that it will transfer 100% of its wholly owned subsidiary Shiseido Liyuan Cosmetics Co. (hereinafter “Shiseido Liyuan”) to an investment consortium led by IDG Capital, with the transaction covering the Aupres brand, the Beijing factory and all production equipment. The move marks the formal departure from the Shiseido system of a 32-year-old Sino-Japanese joint-venture beauty benchmark.
According to the announcement, the buyer consortium comprises three parts: special-purpose vehicles set up by two funds managed by IDG Capital holding a combined 95%, and a limited partnership established by Shiseido Liyuan’s new management team holding the remaining 5%. The transaction is expected to close between the fourth quarter of 2026 and the first quarter of 2027, subject to regulatory approvals. The specific consideration was not disclosed, but based on Shiseido China’s August purchase of the 35% stake held by Beijing Liyuan for 199.5 million yuan (approximately $29.9 million), Shiseido Liyuan is valued at roughly 570 million yuan (approximately $85.4 million).
What bears watching is the pace of the deal. Shiseido Liyuan was originally 65% owned by the Shiseido Group and 35% by Beijing Liyuan, with the third-phase joint-venture agreement set to expire in December 2026 and the two sides agreeing not to renew. In June this year Beijing Liyuan put its 35% stake up for sale; in August Shiseido China took it over for 199.5 million yuan (approximately $29.9 million), completing the transfer on September 1, making Shiseido Liyuan a wholly owned subsidiary. Just over two months later, Shiseido announced it would transfer the entire stake to the IDG consortium. From joint venture to wholly owned subsidiary to full exit, the company changed hands three times in five months.
Shiseido said the move is one of a series of strategic measures to reshape its brand portfolio in the Chinese market and concentrate resources on key brands and growth opportunities. The company also said that against a backdrop of rapid e-commerce expansion, evolving consumer behavior and a steady stream of new entrants, the competitive landscape of China’s beauty market remains in flux, and realizing Shiseido Liyuan’s development requires sustained investment in product innovation and digital capabilities. During the transition period, Shiseido will continue to provide certain intellectual property licensing, new-product R&D support, production technology assistance, and raw-material and partial product supply through a transition services agreement.
Aupres carries no small weight. In 1991, Shiseido and Beijing Liyuan formed the Shiseido Liyuan joint venture, China’s first Sino-Japanese cosmetics joint venture. In January 1994, Aupres — developed specifically for Chinese consumers — opened its first counter at Beijing Wangfujing Department Store, generating more than 20 million yuan (approximately $3.0 million) in revenue that year. The decade and more that followed was its golden age, with counters, beauty advisors and a unified pricing system forming its moat; Aupres, together with OLAY and L’Oréal Paris, was known as the “Three O’s,” and in 2015 sales peaked at about 3 billion yuan (approximately $449.5 million) with nearly 1,000 counters.
The turning point came with the shift in channels. With the rise of e-commerce, department-store channels kept contracting, and the successive emergence of upstart Chinese domestic brands and efficacy-skincare labels made the beauty arena ever more crowded. Counters were once Aupres’s strength but later became a burden. From 2019 to 2023, the number of cosmetics counters in department stores across 51 Chinese cities fell by nearly 6,000. Both ends of the price band tightened simultaneously: Chinese local brands such as Proya pushed upward into the 200-500 yuan range, while international high-end brands such as Estée Lauder and Lancôme stepped up discounts to penetrate downward, leaving Aupres, positioned in the middle, squeezed from both sides.
The financial data directly reflect the pressure.
| Period | Operating Revenue | Net Loss |
|---|---|---|
| Full year 2025 | 869 million yuan (approximately $130.2 million) | 41.337 million yuan (approximately $6.2 million) |
| First five months of 2026 | 234 million yuan (approximately $35.1 million) | 53.4152 million yuan (approximately $8.0 million) |
Note: The loss in the first five months of 2026 already exceeds the full-year level of the prior year.
Even as the losses widened, the Shiseido Group as a whole is on a recovery track. In the first three quarters of 2026, Shiseido posted net sales of 741.1 billion yen (approximately $4.7 billion), up about 7% year on year, and core operating profit of 67.5 billion yen (approximately $424.4 million), up 124% year on year. Net sales in China and travel retail reached 268.5 billion yen (approximately $1.7 billion) in the first three quarters, up 11.9% year on year. At the group level, the direction of concentrating resources on core brands such as Clé de Peau Beauté and SHISEIDO is already clear, and Aupres has been placed in the exit lineup.
This is not Shiseido’s first divestiture of a mass-market brand. In January 2022, the group bundled and sold the affordable brands Za and Pure&Mild to brand-management group URUOI. Under its “2025-2026 Action Plan,” Shiseido plans to concentrate more than 80% of its marketing budget on the eight Core3 and Next5 brands and to add 30 billion yen (approximately $188.6 million) in marketing investment for those eight brands.
IDG’s approach to taking over differs markedly from traditional financial investment. This time it is directly taking on the brand, the company, the Beijing factory and production equipment — a complete operating system rather than a minority stake or brand licensing. IDG has previously invested in beauty and consumer names including Fuqing and Guanxia, and has also participated in projects such as Luckin Coffee and Yoplait China. The 95%-to-5% equity arrangement binds the management team’s interests to the brand’s long-term operation, with a shorter decision-making chain than within a multinational group system.
Zhan Junhao, founder of Fujian Huace Brand Positioning Consulting, believes a more workable approach is to streamline inefficient department-store counters, retain quality locations for experiences, deepen presence on Douyin and Tmall, and pair this with private-domain member operations so that online and offline channels drive traffic to each other. On product positioning, he believes Aupres need not fight hard on cost-effectiveness or high-end premiums, but can anchor to the mature-age skincare niche, strengthen proprietary formulas and a stable reputation, and build differentiation through precise user operations.
Aupres’s change of hands is no isolated case. A batch of Sino-foreign joint-venture cosmetics brands born in the 1990s under the “market for technology” framework — Za, Pure&Mild and others — have in recent years successively exited multinational group systems. In Zhan Junhao’s view, the gradual departure of these old joint-venture brands reflects the maturing of Chinese domestic capabilities in R&D, supply chains and user insight, with the market shifting from foreign-led to fully competitive; the era of relying solely on foreign backing is over.
At the industry level, the deal is also a continuation of this year’s consumer M&A wave. Since 2026, Anta acquired a 29.06% stake in PUMA for about 12 billion yuan (approximately $1.8 billion); CPE acquired 83% of Burger King China and completed the transfer; Boyu Capital’s equity transfer with Starbucks China landed; HongShan completed a controlling acquisition of Golden Goose; and Yum China bought ownership of the Pizza Hut mainland China brand for $1.2 billion. A batch of brands familiar to global consumers is quietly changing hands to Chinese operators.
Shan Weijian, head of PAG, said in an interview this year: “There are two different kinds of opportunities in the market — venture capital invests in high tech, and the biggest opportunity for buyout investors is in consumer.” The logic is that consumer industries have traditionally been seen as rigid and counter-cyclical: demand contracts but does not disappear during economic fluctuations, and brands and cash flow are more graspable.
But buying is only the first step. McDonald’s China took nearly a decade to expand from 2,500 stores to more than 8,000; after being controlled by DCP Capital, RT-Mart closed inefficient stores and turned losses into profits, and that did not rest on a single transaction either. For Aupres, how to rebuild channels, how to defend its pricing system and how to incentivize the management team are the most practical tests facing the new owner. The consumer awareness, membership system and channel relationships built over 32 years will not automatically disappear because of a change of shareholders; whether they can be reactivated depends on whether the new team can find a sustainable position between contracting channels and price-band pressure.






