New Delhi, Nov. 17 — India’s forex reserves declined from its historic peak of $785.71 billion on 4 September 2026 to $719.75 billion on 23 October 2026, a wipeout of $66 billion in 49 days.
Around 50% of the forex inflows accumulated through the special Foreign Currency Non-Resident Bank FCNR(B) deposit scheme has already been used to defend the rupee through reported forex market interventions.
In the last six months, the rupee has faced sustained pressure. From interventions in spot and forward markets to FCNR-B and foreign exchange risk reserve (FERR), a series of measures have been tried. Their effectiveness remains uncertain. It is time to reassess whether the current approach can address the underlying pressures on the currency.
In 1991, India initiated major economic and external-sector reforms, under the shadow of BOP crises. What appeared then as decisions under duress turned out to be beneficial: as Indian markets opened to the world, competitiveness in key export areas emerged. Indian rupee remained loosely tethered to the dollar thereafter.
However, two concerns remained: the sustained depreciation of the rupee (the rupee rising from Rs.35.43 in 1996 to Rs.87.17 against the dollar in 2025, an increase of about 146%) punctuated by periodic crises, notably in 2013 and, more recently, from 2021 onwards; and the failure of exports to grow sufficiently despite this depreciation.
In 2013, the rupee had one of its worst crises following the taper tantrum, showing clearly that the Fed’s actions (and inactions even) may sometimes have a greater impact than domestic conditions. To support the rupee, the RBI came up with a series of measures that have since formed a sort of rulebook: measures to control imports, attract capital inflows (the occasional FCNR-B), spot- and forward-market interventions and finally communication to market participants.
It worked in 2013: will it be effective now?
First, spot-market interventions in the forex market have repercussions on the domestic side: a sale of USD dries up liquidity, requiring an offsetting liquidity operation. FX swaps, as a tool for forward-market intervention, therefore became very common from 2013 onwards.
When domestic liquidity dries up following a forex sale, the central bank does a buy-sell swap: buy-dollar leg will initially infuse rupee liquidity (spot), while the sale of dollars will take place later (forward), anywhere between three months and three years down the line. Effectively, this is a postponement of the dollar liabilities into the future. Figure 1 shows how RBI’s short positions ballooned in recent past.
Second, effectiveness of import controls and export promotion is constrained by both India’s dependence on oil, and the lack of alternative energy sources and the fact that a weaker rupee alone cannot guarantee export competitiveness.
Third, FCNR(B)-like schemes, while attractive, are essentially a form of borrowing from NRIs abroad. The deposits have to be repaid in the future, making it a liability. Moreover, the increase in reserves from such schemes can be wiped away in a matter of days if continued interventions are carried out to support the currency in the face of increased speculation (Figure 2).
Fourth, the RBI has recently introduced a series of measures, from regulations on bank’s net open positions to FERR. Under FERR, a 20% cash reserve requirement on the rupee equivalent of the notional amount of each transaction exceeding $2 million is mandated: for purchase of foreign currency to hedge current-account transactions.
However, these are more stopgap measures. The latest measure worryingly may further discourage hedging in a market where firms reluctantly hedge.
Crucially, most emerging markets, including India, ‘follow’ the US Federal Reserve. Interest rates in a growing economy need not necessarily determine either the profitability of businesses or their ability to undertake capital expenditure. If this were so, the prolonged period of low interest rates would have seen substantial capital expenditure.
A moderately higher interest rate may usher greater saving and support exports. Notably, India’s high growth trajectory during 2002-2008 also coincides with a high-interest-rate regime. Beyond inflation management, calibrated interest-rate measures influencing exchange rates can provide cushion against supply-side shocks.
Finally, central bank communication is a tricky tool, embedded, as it is, with time consistency problems. RBI has reiterated, in recent few years, that India has a ‘market-determined’ exchange rate. However, there are continued reports of interventions in the forex market. Does it lead to a disconnect between words, policies, and actions? A single unguarded statement like 100 being ‘just a number’ from anyone related to policymaking may reduce the credibility of the policy mechanism.
Going forward, controlling inflation on the domestic side and increasing exports by allowing the rupee to remain as competitive as possible may help. India has considerable advantages in sectors such as IT, engineering goods, and gems and jewellery. A key factor that could contribute to the success of exports is the growth of the small and micro industries. Once small businesses scale and access global markets, it would not be difficult to build an export-oriented economy. This would also require a highly competitive rupee for smaller players.
Smita Roy Trivedi is associate professor, National Institute of Bank Management (NIBM); Abhiman Das is ICICI Bank chair professor, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA). Views are strictly personal.
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